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Prior research shows that consumers stop purchasing from firms that treat them badly. In this research we show that consumers also resist firms
that treat other consumers badly while favoring them. In three experiments, we demonstrate such social consciousness in the context of targeted
pricing, where firms offer lower prices to new (versus old) customers. A significant proportion of consumers in our experiments give up money
to resist the price-discriminating firm, especially when the discrimination is more salient or is not justified. Further, perceived unfairness mediates
the relationship between the salience and justification of the pricing practice and consumer resistance.
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Many firms practice discriminatory pricing policies that
favor new customers, believing that new customers will view
such offers positively. However, can this commonly used
marketing tool be considered unfair by potential new customers
so that they give up the lower price that favors them? This is the
research question we investigate in this paper.
Consumers have been shown to boycott firms that engage in
blatant wrong-doing such as using child labor or paying less
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doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2011.11.004Klein, Smith, & John, 2004); to stop purchasing from firms that
treat them badly, e.g., when firms provide bad service or hide
charges in bills (Bechwati & Morrin, 2003, Sen, Gurhan-Canli,
& Morwitz, 2001); and to voluntarily incur a monetary loss to
punish people who violate social norms such as equal division
of money, trust and reciprocity (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000,
Fehr & Gächter, 1997, Fehr, Gächter, & Kirchsteiger, 1997).
In all these instances, the avenging or punishing consumers
are either negatively affected or are at a disadvantage versus
other customers. What has not been shown, therefore, is social
consciousness, or consumers taking costly actions because of
firms' unethical behaviors, even when they are the favored
consumers. More importantly, we show that an everyday mar-
keting context can incite such social consciousness. We bring
into question a typical assumption of pricing models
(Feinberg, Krishna, & Zhang, 2002; Villas-Boas, 1999)—that
consumer advantaged by differential pricing will always
respond positively.
In a series of three experiments, we show that a significant
proportion of potential new consumers give up the enticing
lower price from the discriminating firm and continue purchas-
ing from their non-discriminating firm due to their perceptionsby Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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firms is higher when the policy is made more salient, suggest-
ing that advertising these policies or otherwise making them
more blatant can backfire. Resistance is also found to be higher
when the discriminatory policies are not justified. Additionally,
we show that both concerns for one's own future satisfaction
and concerns for other disadvantaged consumers can motivate
such consumer resistance behavior.2 Models of targeted pricing have also shown that such asymmetries in pricing
practices can exist in equilibrium (e.g., Feinberg et al., 2002).Conceptual framework
We first distinguish between what we term “self-selected”
and “other-selected” price discrimination since the latter alone
falls under our definition of targeted pricing and can evoke
the consumer responses we predict. In “self-selected” price
discrimination, all consumers can avail of the same menu of
prices, but it is consumers' actions (e.g., “when” they buy an air-
line ticket) that results in different prices. In this case, customers
are unlikely to think that the pricing is unfair. In “other-selected”
price discrimination, however, the firm decides which con-
sumers get a lower price. For instance, Sky (a major digital
TV, broadband and phone service provider in the United King-
dom and Ireland) has been implementing differential pricing
strategy favoring new customers in the digital TV service mar-
ket, whereas its competitors (such as Freeview) offer the same
price to all their customers. Many consumers face situations
such as Sky's and this situation is what we view as targeted pric-
ing and focus on.
Literature on targeted pricing in the last two decades
suggests that competitive firms price-discriminating between
existing and new customers should offer a lower price to new
customers (Fudenberg & Tirole, 2000, Taylor, 2003, Villas-
Boas, 1999), assuming that the effect is always positive. How-
ever, recent research on price fairness and boycotts suggests
otherwise. When consumers perceive unfair prices or unethical
marketing practices (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003, Darke &
Dahl, 2003), they respond to it by restraining purchases, com-
plaining, spreading negative word-of-mouth and taking legal
actions (Bechwati & Morrin, 2003, Blodgett, Granbois, &
Walters, 1993, Klein et al., 2004, Richins, 1983, Xia,
Monroe, & Cox, 2004). Building on this literature, we propose
that:
H1. Consumers advantaged by the targeted-pricing policy may
choose to reject the lower price of the discriminating firm, and
continue purchasing from their non-discriminating firm at a
higher price.
According to the literature on persuasion knowledge,
consumers' response to marketing efforts is influenced by their at-
tribution of marketer intent (Brown & Krishna, 2004, Campbell,
1999, 2007, Friestad & Wright, 1994). Campbell (1999 and
2007) suggests that inferred firm motive shapes consumers' per-
ception of price (un)fairness. As a result, advantaged consumers
in our context may be more negatively inclined to the discriminat-
ing firm when its motive is less justifiable.H2. (Firm motive effect) Consumers are more likely to resist
the discriminating firm by rejecting its lower price offer at a
cost to themselves, if the firm motive is seen as less justifiable.
Firms often want to blatantly advertise their discriminatory
pricing policies to attract advantaged customer. However, a
more salient presentation of price discrimination may also
appear more unfair. Further, consumers tend to weigh a more
salient stimulus more in their judgment and decision making
(Krishna & Johar, 1996, Lalwani & Monroe, 2005). As such:
H3. (Salience effect) Consumers are more likely to resist the
discriminating firm by rejecting its lower price offer at a cost
to themselves, if the price discrimination is more as opposed
to less salient.
The salience effect is expected to be even stronger if the firm
motive is not justified, since in this instance consumers will be
even more skeptical of the firm's practices (Brown & Krishna,
2004, Forehand & Grier, 2003, Friestad & Wright, 1994).
H4. (Interaction effect): The salience effect will be even stron-
ger if the firm motive is not justified.
We also propose that the salience effect and firm motive effect
are both mediated by consumers' perception of price unfairness.
Formally:
H5. Perceived price unfairness will mediate the effect of price
discrimination salience/firm motive justification on consumer
resistance of the discriminating firm.Overview of experiments
Our experiments are carefully designed to measure the
likelihood of resistance to price-discriminating firms and the
amount consumers will give up. We consider a scenario with
two competing firms, each having their current (old) customers
and considering the other firm's customers as their potential
new customers. Fig. 1 illustrates our experimental setup.
In study 1 and study 2, we allow one “discriminating” firm
(DIFF) to offer a lower price to new versus old customers,
but let the other “non-discriminating” firm (SAME) charge
the same price to all customers. This way, consumers do not
have to stop purchasing in order to avoid price unfairness.2 In
this setting, we expect that some advantaged consumers
(those who perceive greater unfairness from targeted pricing)
will resist DIFF and will choose to stay with their current
firm, SAME, leaving money on the table.
Since there can be strong demand effects for consumers to
demonstrate fairness, a direct questioning approach (e.g.,
“how much would you be willing to give up to resist an unfair
firm?”) seems unreasonable. We modify a price-until-switching
approach (Gonzalez & Wu, 1999) to measure the amount
Fig. 1. a: Experimental setup in study 1 and study 2. b: Experimental setup in study 3.
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participants bear an actual monetary loss for such resistance,
because it is easy to be an armchair ethicist, whereas it is
much harder to act on one's stated beliefs bearing a real cost
(Alwitt & Pitts, 1996).
Study 3 uses a more traditional one-decision experimental
approach to demonstrate consumer resistance and to uncover
some underlying reasons for consumer resistance.Exhibit 1
Situation presented to subjects
Study 1 and study 2
After graduation from the university, you have worked
in a regional office of a company for one year. After one
more year, you will be transferred to the company's head-
quarters which is located in a different state. You use aStudy 1: Do consumers resist a discriminating firm?
Two hundred and twenty-seven undergraduate students from
a southwest university participated in this study in return for
class credit. The study had a 2 (high versus low salience of
discrimination)×2 (justified versus not justified firm motive)
between-subjects design.high-speed Internet connection to stay connected with
your friends and family. Two reputable firms (ConnStar
and NetSpeed) are providing high-speed Internet services
in your area. The two services are practically identical to
each other in every aspect. For the first year, you pur-
chased from ConnStar. Now you only need another year
of service. You know that neither firm offers service in
the state where your company's headquarters is, so you
will not deal with these firms any more after the end of
next year.Procedure
Each participant was given a questionnaire that started with
a cover story about the market, where two firms (NetSpeed and
ConnStar) both offered high-speed Internet service. The
participants were asked to imagine themselves in the situation
given in Exhibit 1.
This situation describes a typical decision that consumers
face when offered promotions. Note that to measure resistance
to unfairness by advantaged customers, a subject's role wasalways the potential new customer of DIFF. In the example
shown in Exhibit 1, the participant was an old customer of Con-
nStar (SAME) and a potential new customer of NetSpeed
(DIFF). We intentionally allowed participants to make
decisions for only next year and not many years to come.
Otherwise, subscribing with SAME could be the better choice
in the long run, because they could save up to $28 for the
Table 1




Price to new customers+
switching cost (adaptor






Choice 1 $440 $280+$52=$332 $360 $360
Choice 2 $440 $280+$56=$336 $360 $360
Choice 3 $440 $280+$60=$340 $360 $360
Choice 4 $44 $280+$64=$344 $360 $360
Choice 5 $440 $280+$68=$348 $360 $360
Choice 6 $440 $280+$72=$352 $360 $360
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that which was an $80 loss (i.e., $440−$360). We also
controlled the perceived service quality of the firms in order
to rule out other potential explanations for our results.
After the cover story, the participants learned about the
pricing policies of the two competing firms, and DIFF's motive
behind its pricing policy (if in the justified condition). Partici-
pants were then asked to make a series of choices between
DIFF and SAME on a decision sheet (details follow), then to
explain why they made the choices they did, and finally to
provide demographic information.Choice 7 $440 $280+$76=$356 $360 $360
Choice 8 $440 $280+$80=$360 $360 $360
Choice 9 $440 $280+$84=$364 $360 $360
Choice 10 $440 $280+$88=$368 $360 $360
Choice 11 $440 $280+$92=$372 $360 $360
Choice 12 $440 $280+$96=$376 $360 $360
Choice 13 $440 $280+$100=$380 $360 $360
Choice 14 $440 $280+$104=$384 $360 $360
Choice 15 $440 $280+$108=$388 $360 $360
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5
5 The salience manipulation was examined in a separate post-test. Using theChoice scenarios in the decision sheet
In the decision sheet, prices offered by the two firms (SAME
andDIFF) and the switching cost for consumers were all presented
in a single table (see Table 1). The consumer needed to pay a
switching cost only if she decided to switch from SAME to
DIFF. Switching cost was operationalized as the expense of a
unique adaptor that one had to purchase when changing the service
provider.3 Participants made a total of 15 choices for which of the
two firms they would buy from at different switching costs.
In Table 1, the bold numbers are the prices the subjects
could get from each firm. These were presented in the middle
columns (column 3 and column 4) for ease of comparison.
The prices for the other consumer segment—the disadvantaged
(old) consumers of DIFF—were also listed. The prices a
subject (as a new customer of DIFF) could get were her current
price at SAME (the bold number $360) or the deal offer from
DIFF (the bold number $280, although the total cost would
be higher due to the switching cost). Participants were asked
to circle one of the two bold prices within each row, indicating
which firm they chose in that specific scenario.
Consistent with Holt and Laury (2002) and Gonzalez and Wu
(1999), we designed the table such that the total cost for the new
customers of DIFF systematically changes from the 1st to the
15th choice, and hence one can observe at which point the deci-
sion maker switches from one firm to the other. This switching
point captures the maximum amount a consumer would be will-
ing to give up to resist DIFF. Thus, in Table 1, the switching
cost increases by an incremental amount of $4 from one choice
to the next.4 A consumer who maximizes her own monetary pay-
off should choose DIFF (NetSpeed in Table 1) in choices 1–7,
and switch to SAME (ConnStar) in choices 9–15. For choice 8,
the consumer should be indifferent between the two and so
would randomly pick one. Choosing SAME (ConnStar) before
choice 8 is interpreted as resisting DIFF (NetSpeed) at a cost.
We counterbalanced firm names such that for half the
subjects NetSpeed was DIFF and for the other half ConnStar
was DIFF (“firm name effect”); for half of the participants3 Participants were told to ignore any hassle of switching (time, effort, and
etc.) so that the only switching cost for them was the price of the adaptor.
4 We vary the switching cost instead of the price of DIFF to keep the level of
price discrimination constant across choice scenarios. This is also less confusing
for subjects.DIFF was presented on the left side of the table and for the
other half on the right (“order effect”).Manipulations
Firm motive
In the conditions with justified firmmotive, the discriminating
firm's pricing policy was justified as, “the firm (DIFF) wants to
help new customers to pay any potential switching cost so that
they will enjoy (DIFF)'s service more easily”. In the conditions
where firm motive was not justified, we simply did not describe
any firm motive in the text.Salience of targeted pricing
We manipulated high discrimination salience by inserting a
flier into the questionnaire bearing the name of DIFF. The flyer
only included pricing information of DIFF and a call for action:
Attention: NEW Customers
YOUR price: $280/year
compared to $440/year for our EXISTING customers
Switching to our service is hassle-free. Act now!
Although the flier did not provide the subjects with any
information beyond what they already saw in the questionnaire,
it made the targeted pricing policy more prominent for decision
making.5scale: “Overall, how important was the fact that (DIFF) charged different
prices to old and new customers in influencing your choice between the two
firms? (1 being very unimportant–9 being very important)”, we found that the
mean in the high salience condition was 7.18 versus 5.58 in the low salience
condition (F(1, 39)=6.16, pb .05), although the price table was exactly the











Fig. 2. a: Percentages of subjects who resisted DIFF (study 1). b: Average cost
of resisting DIFF−maximum loss (study 1).
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There are two dependent variables—resistance and maximum
loss. We also collect subjects' reasons for why they did what they
do to measure perceptions of fairness.
Resistance
“Resistance” is a dummy variable that takes the value of one
if the participant is willing to undergo some cost (however
small) to stay away from DIFF. Otherwise, resistance takes
the value of zero.
Maximum loss
Maximum loss represents the maximum amount of money a
participant is willing to give up to refrain from purchasing from
DIFF. Per the experiment design, the values of maximum loss
can be one of the following: 0 (the participant being totally
“rational” by choosing the lower total cost in every scenario),
4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28 (the participant choosing to purchase
from SAME in all 15 scenarios). For example, in Table 1 if
the participant decides to stay with SAME for choices 3
through 15, then she is willing to bear a maximum loss of
$20 (i.e., maximum loss=20).
Perceived unfairness
Participants' stated reasons for their choices were coded for
whether these were related to ethics/fairness (1) or not (0). For
example, some subjects stated that “I made my choices based
on the fact that new and old customers are charged different
prices (by DIFF). …… It is not fair to entice people to come
to your company and then overcharge them once you have
their loyalty”; or “I don't like to support a company that
discounts prices so heavily for new customers and charges a
higher price to previous clients”. For these subjects perceived
unfairness was coded as 1. When subjects' stated reasons
were irrelevant to ethics/fairness, perceived unfairness took
the value of 0.
Results of study 1
Main and interaction effects of gender, age, firm name and
order are not significant, and are dropped from our analyses.
In Fig. 2a, we report the percentage of participants who chose
to resist DIFF; and in Fig. 2b the average amount of money
participants were willing to forgo for resisting DIFF.
Probability of participants resisting
Overall, 49 out of the 227 participants in study 1 chose to
purchase from SAME in situations where their cost would
have been lower had they purchased from DIFF—this
accounted for 21.59% of the subjects. This percentage is
statistically greater than zero (pb .01) and supports H1. A
Logit model with resistance (yes/no) as the dependent variable
and salience and firm motive as the independent variables
(contrast-coded to be mean-centered) shows that both salience
(z=2.27; pb .05) and firm motive (z=−3.27; pb .01) are
significant, whereas their interaction is not (p>.2).Consistent with H2, more participants resisted DIFF when
the firm motive was not justified (31.86% across the two not-
justified cells) versus when it was (11.40% across the two
justified cells; pb .01). Consistent with H3, a higher percentage
of participants chose to resist DIFF when the price discrimina-
tion was more (28.81% across the two high salience cells) ver-
sus less salient (13.76% across the two low salience cells;
pb .01).Maximum loss
As stated earlier, by design, the largest possible value for
maximum loss is $28. The mean of maximum loss for those
who chose to resist DIFF (49 subjects) was $21.79. In fact,
31 of the 49 subjects (63.27%) were “right censored” at $28
because they chose to stay with SAME for all 15 choices, i.e.,
6 Given the interaction between salience and justification, we also tested for
mediated moderation following Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005). We tested
whether salience's mediation process (that perceived unfairness mediates the ef-
fect of salience on resistance) is moderated by justification of the firm's motive,
and found support for it. When firm motive is not justified, the impact of the
mediator (perceived unfairness) on maximum loss is significantly stronger than
when firm motive is justified.
7 We use a formula to convert experimental money to actual payment. The
formula was designed to give a feasible range of payment for each subject,
while keeping the actual “maximum loss” of resisting DIFF substantial. Please
see the Appendix for more details.
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money to give up.
We conducted an ANOVA for the maximum loss partici-
pants were willing to bear as a function of discrimina-
tion salience and firm motive. The results show that
there are significant main effects of discrimination salience
(F(1,223)=7.86, pb .01) and firm motive (F(1,223)=10.30,
pb .01)—when price discrimination is more salient and
when firm motive is not justified, people give up more
money to resist DIFF. The interaction between salience and
motive is also significant (F(1,223)=4.02, pb .05). Simple
main effect analysis shows that discrimination salience is
significant when firm motive is not justified (M=$9.69 for
salient versus M=$3.63 for not salient; F(1,223)=11.50,
pb .01), and not significant when firm motive is justified
(M=$3.12 for salient versus M=$2.11 for not salient;
p> .5). Similarly, justification of firm motive has a signifi-
cant effect on how much money people are willing to leave
on the table when discrimination is more salient (M=$3.12 for
justified versus M=$9.69 for not justified; F(1,223)=14.15,
pb .01), but not when discrimination is less salient (M=$2.11
for justified versus M=$3.63 for not justified; p>.4). Overall,
these findings support our hypothesis on the effects of firm mo-
tive, discrimination salience, and their interaction (H2~H4).
Mediation analysis
The mediation process we have hypothesized is as follows:
Salience=justification of discriminating policies→
perception of unfairness→resistance to DIFF:
Therefore, we examine whether perceived unfairness mediates
the impact of salience and of justification on maximum loss.
Perceived unfairness was coded by two independent coders
blind to the hypotheses, and the agreement rate was 95%. Any
disagreements were resolved by discussion. Analyses conducted
through Preacher and Hayes's (2004) macro with 5000 boot-
strapped samples indicate indirect only mediation (Zhao,
Lynch, & Chen, 2010) for both independent variables. In the
salience model, controlling for justification, salience is shown
to have a significant and positive total effect on maximum loss
(Β=3.52, t(227)=2.78, pb .01). The indirect path of the effect
of salience on maximum loss through perceived unfairness is
also positive and significant, with the 95% confidence interval
excluding zero (1.1632 to 4.4803). The direct effect of salience
on maximum loss is positive but not significant (Β=.83, t(227)=
.81, p>.4). Taken together, these results indicate an indirect
only mediation for the effect of salience. A second model
examines the mediation path for justification while controlling
for salience. Results show that justification has a significant
negative total effect on maximum loss (Β=−4.15, t(227)=
−3.27, pb .01). The indirect path of the effect of justification
through perceived unfairness is significant and negative, with the
95% confidence interval excluding zero (−4.5921 to –1.1301).
The direct effect of justification on maximum loss is negative
but not significant (Β=−1.39, t(227)=−1.35, p>.1), suggestingan indirect only mediation for the effect of justification on
maximum loss.
Overall, the mediation analysis provides strong support for
H5.6
Discussion
In study 1, we find strong support for all hypotheses.
Advantaged consumers of targeted pricing bear a cost to resist
a discriminating firm, and this resistance increases with lack
of justification and higher salience of price discrimination.
Perception of unfairness seems to drive the behavior. In study
1, consumers did not give up real money. In study 2, we test
if they would.
Study 2: Do consumers resist a discriminating firm even at
a real cost to themselves?
Since consumer resistance in study 1 was stronger in the
condition where firm motive was not justified, in study 2 we
focus on this condition, using a one-way between-subjects
design with salience of price discrimination manipulated to be
high or low. Ninety two undergraduate students from a South-
west university participated.
Procedure
Participants were fully informed of themonetary compensation.
Before the cover story, they read “The choices that youmake in this
study will determine how much money you earn.” Just before
subjects made their decisions in the 15 choice scenarios, they
read about how exactly their payment would be calculated.7 Basi-
cally, just like in the real world, the more a subject paid for a ser-
vice, the less experimental money she was left with; so, the less
money she received. The maximum possible loss to subjects who
resistedDIFFwas $3—that is, theywould be paid $3 less than sub-
jects who made all “rational” payoff maximizing choices. The
mean payment to our participants was $9.16, and the range was
$6.50–9.50.
Results of study 2
No gender, order, age, or firm name main or interaction effects
were found, and thus they are not discussed further. Fig. 3a and
Fig. 3b summarize the percentage of participants who chose to







Fig. 3. a: Percentages of subjects who resisted DIFF (study 2). b: Average cost
of resisting DIFF−maximum loss (study 2).
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Consistent with H1, a significant percentage of subjects
resisted DIFF at their own cost (13 out of 97 subjects, or
13.40%; this is significantly different to zero, pb .01). A higher
percentage of participants chose to resist DIFF in the high
salience condition (22.00%) versus the low salience condition
(4.26%). A simple Logit model with resistance (yes/no) as the
dependent variable and salience as the independent variable
shows that the salience effect is statistically significant
(z=2.31, pb .05), supporting H3.
Maximum loss
Subjects who resisted DIFF chose to bear close to the highest
cost possible (M=$22.15). This again suggests that some people
may sacrifice even more money if they were given the option to
do so. Across all subjects (including those who did not resist
DIFF), people were willing to bear a higher cost when the sa-
lience of discrimination was high (M=$4.64) than when it was
low (M=$0.43; t (95)=2.38, pb .05). This pattern closelyresembles what we found in study 1. In an ANOVA with
maximum loss as the dependent variable and discrimination sa-
lience as the independent variable, we again observe a significant
main effect of salience (F(1,95)=5.66, pb .05).
Mediation analysis
When coding the perception of unfairness, the agreement
rate between the two independent judges was 98% and any dis-
agreements were resolved by discussion. We used the Preacher
and Hayes's (2004) macro with 5000 bootstrapped samples to
examine whether perceived unfairness mediates the impact of
salience on maximum loss. Results show that salience has a sig-
nificant and positive total effect (Β=4.21, t(97)=2.38, pb .05).
The indirect path of the effect of salience on maximum loss
through perceived unfairness is significant, with its 95% confi-
dence interval excluding zero (.3893 to 6.2028). Moreover, the
direct effect of salience on maximum loss is not significant
(Β=1.15, t(97)=1.00, p>.3). Therefore, we find indirect only
mediation, where subjects' perceived unfairness mediates the
effect of discrimination salience on the maximum loss they
are willing to bear in resisting DIFF.
Discussion
With real monetary payment to the participants, study 2
closely replicates the results of the non-payment conditions in
study 1. Hypotheses H1, H3 and H5 are again strongly sup-
ported in this study. Thus, we are more confident of our theory.
While fewer consumers resisted the discriminating firm in this
study than in study 1 where subjects were not paid, the percent-
age of consumers resisting is still meaningful.
Study 3: Why do consumers resist the discriminating firm?
Thirty-six evening MBA students from a Southwest univer-
sity participated in study 3 for class credit. The study used a
one-way design with two conditions. One condition
(“SAME–DIFF” in Fig. 1b) used the same experimental set
up as studies 1 and 2, where subjects were current customers
of SAME and potential new customers of DIFF. We used the
not-justified, salient context so that firm motive was not stated
and a flyer from DIFF was given to subjects. The other condi-
tion (“SAME–SAME2”) involved two non-discriminating
firms. Subjects were current customers of SAME but could
take advantage of a lower price offered by another non-
discriminating firm (SAME2). Subjects made only one decision
in study 3. Table 2 presents the decision they faced in the ex-
periment. The bold numbers in Table 2 represent the prices
the subjects could get from each firm.
Subjects could save $15 if they switched from their current
firm (SAME) to the other firm (DIFF or SAME2, depending
on the condition). The only difference between the two condi-
tions was that the other firm (NetSpeed) price discriminated
in SAME–DIFF but charged the same price to both segments
in SAME–SAME2. All subjects provided reasons for their de-
cision in an open-ended question. Also, in SAME–DIFF, we
asked subjects to state how much they agreed with the
Table 2
Choice scenario in study 3.




Price to old customers
(your total cost with
ConnStar)
Price to new customers+
switching cost (for adaptor)=




SAME–DIFF condition: DIFF enticing customers away from SAME
$360 $360 $280+$65=$345 $440
SAME–SAME2 condition: another non-discrimination firm (SAME2)
offering a lowing price to all customers
$360 $360 $280+$65=$345 $280
Table 3










Mean for the 14 subjects who
resisted DIFF
3.21 6.43 6.29 4.29
Mean for the 5
subjects who
switched to DIFF
4.80 5.00 6.00 6.00
p-Value 0.023** 0.060 * 0.537 0.039 **
* mean comparison significant at 0.1 level.
** mean comparison significant at 0.05 level.
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“strongly disagree”, 4 “undecided”, and 7 “strongly agree”):
(1) “I am confident that I will be satisfied with NetSpeed if I
switch to it.” (2) “I don't like the fact that NetSpeed is charg-
ing old customers a high price.” (3) “In general, I try to
avoid companies that are involved in unethical practices.”
(4) “I believe NetSpeed is using a lower introductory price
to acquire new customers, which is a reasonable, common
business practice.”
The first three scales reflect expected future satisfaction,
concern for disadvantaged consumers, and concern for ethics,
respectively; the last scale serves as a control, because con-
sumers may resist less if they perceive a discriminating pricing
policy as an acceptable market norm.Results of study 3
Probability of participants resisting
Overall resistance in study 3 was relatively high, likely
because the subjects were (working) MBA students who
could be less motivated by small amount of savings than un-
dergraduate students. More importantly, when the deal was
offered by DIFF, resistance rate was 73.68% (14 out of 19
subjects). When the same amount of savings was offered
by a non-discriminating firm, the resistance rate was much
lower at 41.18% (7 out of 17 subjects). This difference in re-
sistance is caused by targeted pricing, and is significant at
0.05 level.8Reasons for resistance
Within the SAME–DIFF condition, we compare the means
of the four motivation scales between the group of subjects
who resisted DIFF versus those who did not resist and switched
to DIFF. The results are presented in Table 3.8 We conducted the same mediation analysis as in study 1 and study 2 to test
the following process: existence of discriminating policy→perception of un-
fairness (coded from open-ended question)→decision to stay or to switch.
We replicated the findings of the previous two studies, as the results indicated
an indirect only mediation through the perception of unfairness.Both expected future satisfaction with DIFF and concerns
for disadvantaged consumers seem to drive consumer resis-
tance to DIFF. The overall propensity for ethics does not
seem to affect this decision—the ethics scale receiving a high
score both from switchers and non-switchers; almost everyone,
expectedly, claimed that they would not interact with an unethi-
cal firm. Moreover, as expected, those who believed DIFF was
adopting a commonly-used introductory pricing policy resisted
the firm less.
Conclusions and future research
General discussion
In three experiments, we show that targeted pricing—a com-
mon marketing tool—can evoke social consciousness for a sub-
set of advantaged consumers so that they are willing to incur a
cost for resistance. We notice that the proportion of respondents
who resisted the lower priced offer at a real financial cost (e.g.,
in study 2) is relatively low. However, this is still a meaningful
subset of respondents, especially considering that individuals
can be much more involved and motivated in their real-life
choices.
It is important to note that consumer resistance is stronger
when the savings are made more salient in promotional mate-
rials. This presents a dilemma for marketers who generally be-
lieve that making price deals salient should entice more people
to switch to them. Resistance is also higher when the firm's mo-
tivation for price discrimination is not justified by it, suggesting
that firms may be able to reduce the negative reactions of con-
sumers by providing clearer indication of their motives when
offering the savings.
Our research also reveals that perceived unfairness mediates
the effect of justification and salience on resistance. In study 3,
we find that those who resisted the price deal were more con-
cerned about the group of customers whom the firm discrimi-
nated against than were those who switched to the
discriminating firm. Further, the resisters expected to have
lower satisfaction with the discriminating firm—these con-
sumers may have derived negative inferences (e.g., about the
firm's level of customer service) from the pricing policy of
the discriminating firm.
441Y. Wang, A. Krishna / Journal of Consumer Psychology 22 (2012) 433–442Future research
Consumers often need to balance their moral concerns
against their materialistic desires in the marketplace (Alwitt
& Pitts, 1996; Bian & Keller, 1999; Folkes & Kamins,
1999; Irwin, 1999). Our research identifies two moderators
(justification and salience) of resistance to perceived unfair-
ness. Future research should explore other conditions
where ethical concerns of consumers would trump their
self-interested behavior.
Consumers' perception of fairness can be shaped by market-
place norms. We find that when respondents perceived the
price discrimination as a temporary introductory price and com-
mon business practice, they resisted the discriminating firm
less. In all our experiments, it was evident that existing and
new customers are paying different prices. It is possible that
the results may weaken when the discriminatory pricing is not
so evident. Future research could test the hypotheses in a situa-
tion where there are low introductory prices to new customers
but prices to existing customers are not mentioned; or in a situ-
ation where new customers are told what prices will be when
they join and also after an introductory period. It would also
be interesting to explore how pricing policies vary across indus-
tries and become the accepted norm, decreasing consumer re-
sistance, and the effect of the subsequent marketplace norms
on consumer behavior.
Our results indicate that common marketing tools may be
perceived as social violations and have negative consequences,
and that firms' behaviors do not have to be egregious for such
negative responses. We hope that our work spurs more research
on how other commonly used marketing tools can invoke social
consciousness and affect consumer behavior. Our research also
suggests that the perceptions of fairness, and, more generally,
the value attached to maintaining one's moral standards should
be considered in marketing models.
Appendix A. Payment in study 2
How much money will you make from this study?
You will be asked to make 15 choices between these two
firms in 15 different scenarios. Since you are an “old customer”
of ConnStar but a (potential) “new customer” for NetSpeed,
you should look at the bolded numbers in the table on next
page for the prices you can get from the two firms. Your deci-
sions on which firm to buy from will determine the amount of
money you earn.
Specifically, we add up all the prices you pay to the firms
(plus switching cost, if applicable) and divide them by 15
(i.e., the number of choices you make). This gives us your “av-
erage cost” for the high-speed Internet service. We will then
give you:
$ 376–average costð Þ=2:5;
in cash. For example, if your average cost is $360, we will pay
you $6.40 (calculated from the above formula).Please note that when you choose a firm's service, the firm
earns additional money from you. The more you pay a firm,
the less money you make and the more money the firm
makes. The other firm, the one you do not choose, makes no
money from you for that choice.References
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